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COMMENTS
COMMERCIAL LAW-BANKS AND BANKINGPARTNERSHIPS-RIGHT OF PARTNERS TO
DAMAGES FOR WRONGFULLY DISHONORED
PARTNERSHIP CHECKS*
The partnership has long defied attempts of the law to place it
into a conceptual pigeonhole.1 It fits neatly within no traditional
category 2 ; scholars have debated its natures; and the controversy
continues: Is the partnership an aggregate or an entity ?4 Or, indeed,
is it either? The answer to this conceptual puzzle is by no means of
interest only to legal theoreticians. Its ramifications permeate unexpected corners and crevices of the law.'
The civil law treats the partnership as a juristic person possessing
a distinctive legal personality, much as our present law regards the
corporation.6 It was viewed by the English common law, however,
as no more than a convenient way to express the relationship between
the partners and their resultant rights and liabilities. 7 The partnership concept in the United States today is far from being well defined. For some purposes, it is dealt with as a separate entity, while
for others it is treated as an association of two or more persons,
seen as individuals.
A major characteristic of the partnership which is difficult to
reconcile with the separate entity theory is the liability of the individual partners for partnership obligations. Their personal assets
may be reached by creditors of the partnership, whether the debt
has its origin in contract s or in tort.9 The commercial world, however, often looks on a partnership as being in some way distinct
from its members, so that it may be termed a commercial entity even
* Loucks v. Albuquerque National Bank, 76 N.M. 735, 418 P.2d 191 (1966).
1. 1 S. Rowley, Partnershp § 1.3 (2d ed. 1960).
2. Id. § 1.3D.
3. See, e.g., Crane, The Uniform Partnership Act-A Criticism, 28 Harv. L. Rev.
762 (1915) ; and Lewis, The Uniform PartnershipAct-A Reply to Mr. Crane's Criticism, 29 Harv. L. Rev. 158, 291 (1916).
4. Jensen, Is a Partnershipunder the Uniform PartnershipAct an Aggregate or an
Entity?, 16 Vand. L. Rev. 377 (1963).
5. J. Crane, Partnership § 3 (2d ed. 1952).
6. Id.
7. 1 S. Rowley, Partnership § 1.3 (2d ed. 1960).
8. Wheatley v. Carl M. Halvorson, Inc., 213 Ore. 228, 323 P.2d 49 (1958).
9. Phillips v. Cook, 239 Md. 215, 210 A.2d 743 (1965).
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in circumstances where the law does not treat it as a legal entity.'0
The entity concept is employed in various situations to achieve a
just result which might not otherwise be possible." Generally, the
ultimate aim of such treatment is fairness and convenience; the entity
theory cannot be invoked where it would result in the contrary. 2
Perhaps the most accurate summary of the current conceptual
treatment is that a partnership will not generally be regarded as a
legal entity entirely separate and distinct from its members, but it
may be dealt with as such if the legal fiction of the entity aids in
accomplishing a desired end.'"
The case of Loucks v. Albuquerque National Bank 1 4 illustrates
some of the problems that can result when an attempt is made to
apply the partnership concept to a specific situation. The plaintiffs,
who were partners doing business under the name of L & M Paint
and Body Shop, opened a checking account in the partnership name
with the Albuquerque National Bank. Subsequently, the bank wrongfully charged a delinquent personal indebtedness of one of the
partners against the partnership account. As a result, nine or ten
partnership checks were dishonored by the bank.' 5
The partners sought recovery on behalf of the partnership for
(1) the amount wrongfully charged against the account, (2) damages to credit, good reputation, and business standing in the community, (3) loss of income, and (4) punitive damages. One of the
partners sought recovery for damages suffered from an ulcer allegedly caused by the bank's wrongful dishonor of the checks, and each
partner individually sought punitive damages and damages to his
personal credit, good reputation and business standing.' The trial
court removed all questions of damages from the jury except the
issue involving the sum wrongfully charged against the account. On
appeal by plaintiffs to the New Mexico Supreme Court, held, Re.
versed and Remanded for a new trial solely on the question of damages to partnership credit. The court specifically denied the right of
10. J. Crane, Partnership § 3 (2d ed. 1952).
11. Grober v. Kahn, 47 N.J. 135, 219 A.2d 601 (1966).
12. Scott v. United States, 354 F.2d 292 (Ct. CI. 1965).
13. Close-Smith v. Conley, 230 F. Supp. 411 (D.C. Ore. 1964) ; 501 DeMers, Inc. v.
Fink, 148 N.W.2d 820 (N.D. 1967). But see In re Svoboda & Hannah, 180 Neb. 215, 142
N.W.2d 328 (1966).
14. 76 N.M. 735, 418 P.2d 191 (1966).
15. Id. at 739, 418 P.2d at 194.
16. Id. at 741, 418 P.2d at 195.
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the individual partners to recover damages for any personal losses
or injuries they may have sustained.
The court's opinion was based on its interpretation of the word
"customer" in § 4-402 of the Uniform Commercial Code 17 , which
provides:
A payor bank is liable to its customer for damages proximately
caused by the wrongful dishonor of an item. When the dishonor occurs
through mistake liability is limited to actual damages proved. If so
proximately caused and proved damages may include damages for an
arrest or prosecution of the customer or other consequential damages.
Whether any consequential damages are proximately caused by the
wrongful dishonor is a question of fact to be determined in each case.
The court reasoned that the "customer" of the bank, as contemplated by the quoted section of the Uniform Commercial Code, was
the partnership; therefore, any right of recovery belonged to the
partnership as an entity separate and distinct from the two partners.1 8
The individual partners, according to the court's reasoning, had no
right of action against the bank because they were not the "customers" protected by the statute. 9
Three major faulty premises provided the foundation for the
court's acceptance of the entity concept of a partnership. One is
found in the court's reference to the Uniform Partnership Act. 20 A
partnership, it is stated, is treated by the act as a legal entity for
some purposes. While this is an undeniably true statement of the
law, it is not authority for the result reached by the court. A brief
review of the history of the act 21 leads to the conclusion that the
common law or aggregate theory was largely retained by the draftsmen of the Uniform Partnership Act,22 subject to only a few modifications. These modifications permit an application of the entity
theory for purposes of facilitating transfers of property, marshalling assets, and protecting the operation of the business from the
17. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 50A-4-402 (Repl. 1962). New Mexico has adopted the Uniform Commercial Code as N.M. Stat. Ann. 50A-1-101 to -9-507 (Repl. 1962).
18. 76 N.M. at 742, 418 P.2d at 196. The issue was not raised either at the trial level
or in the briefs on appeal. It appeared for the first time in the opinion.
19. 76 N.M. at 742, 418 P.2d at 196.
20. Adopted in New Mexico as N.M. Stat. Ann. 66-1-1 to -43 (Repl. 1960).
21. The history can be found in the Commissioners' prefatory note to the act, 7
U.L.A. 2 (1949). Summaries of interest are also contained in Mazzuchelli v. Silberberg,
29 N.J. 15, 148 A.2d 8 (1959) ; and Helvering v. Smith, 90 F.2d 590 (2d Cir. 1937).
22. In Helvering v. Smith, 90 F.2d at 591, Judge Learned Hand stated the point
quite succinctly: "it would be a palpable perversion to understand the act as creating
a new juristic person ......
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immediate impact of personal involvements with the partners. 3
Aside from making use of the conceptual tool of the entity for those
procedural and conveyancing purposes, which have no application in
the Loucks case, the act preserves the traditional aggregate concept.

24

A second faulty premise used by the court in supporting its acceptance of the entity concept is found in its citation of N.M. Stat.
Ann. § 21-6-525 and § 21-1-1 (4) (0)26 (1953). These statutes, however, merely provide methods by which litigation involving partnerships can be facilitated through more convenient service of process
and permitting suit in the firm name. A federal district court in New
York, construing similar provisions in the New York Civil Practice
Act, 27 found it clear that the procedural treatment "was never intended to make a New York partnership a separate legal entity
apart from that of the partners.

128

The statutes have no application

beyond the particular matters with which they deal, and do not
change the essential features of the partnership.29
The third, and most significant, faulty premise, is expressed in
the court's unqualified statement: "The Uniform Commercial Code
expressly regards a partnership as a legal entity.130 The court is
wrong. No stand is taken by the Uniform Commercial Code as to
the legal nature of a partnership. Section 1-201 (28),3' which de23. McKinney v. Truck Ins. Exch., 324 S.W.2d 773 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959).
24. Thomas v. Industrial Comm'n, 243 Wis. 231, 10 N.W.2d 206 (1943).
25. "Suits may be brought by or against a partnership as such, or against all or

either of the individual members thereof; and a judgment against the firm as
such may be enforced against the partnership's property, or that of such members as have appeared or been served with summons; but a new action may be
brought against the other members in the original cause of action."

26. "Upon domestic or foreign corporations or upon a partnership or other unincorporated association which is subject to suit under a common name, [service
may be made] by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to an
officer, a managing or general agent, or to any other agent authorized by ap-

pointment or by law to receive service of process and, if the agent is one authorized by statute to receive service and the statute so requires, by also mailing a copy to the defendant."
27. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 222-a (1920). The act has been recodified and is now
N.Y. Civ. Prac. §§310, 5018(a) and 5201(b)

(McKinney 1963).

28. Koons v. Kaiser, 91 F. Supp. 511, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
29. 40 Am. Jur. Partnership § 435 (1942) ; 68 C.J.S. Partnership§ 67 (1950).

30. 76 N.M. at 742, 418 P.2d at 196.
31. " 'Organization' includes a corporation, government or governmental subdivision or agency, business trust, estate, trust, partnership or association, two
or more persons having a joint or common interest, or any other legal or com-

mercial entity." (emphasis supplied). N.M. Stat. Ann. § 50A-1-201 (28)
1962).

(Repl.
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fines "organization," provided the basis for the court's statement.
The partnership is included in the definition of "organization," but
then so is an "association," and even "two or more persons having
a joint or common interest." Comment 28 to that section explains
that subsection 28 "is the definition of every type of entity or association, excluding an individual, acting as such." (emphasis supplied). The definition obviously encompasses both those organizations which are normally entities in the view of the law and those
which only bear some resemblance to such juristic persons. The
Code's definition of "organization" is, therefore, doubtful authority
for treating every commercial entity as a legal entity.
Serious implications for a number of areas of partnership law
are raised by the decision. For example, what effect does the holding
that the Uniform Commercial Code expressly regards a partnership as a legal entity have upon the traditional individual liability of
partners for partnership obligations when transactions under the
Code are involved? Would the result be the insulation of the partners and their personal assets from the operation of individual liability? Considering the scope of the Code, the potential effects on
commercial law would be enormous should the court follow Loucks
and interpret the Code as treating a partnership as a legal person
for the purposes of applying all its provisions.32
Another question arises from the provision in § 4-402 giving a
right of recovery when an arrest or prosecution of the customer is
proximately caused by the dishonor of the checks.83 An individual
can be arrested and prosecuted for committing a crime; a corporation can be prosecuted and fined upon conviction; a partnership cannot be prosecuted or convicted, however, because it cannot commit
a crime.34 The case of State v. Spears emphatically stated that guilt
attaches to the individual guilty members, but that the partnership
is not a person separate from its members in the sense that a corporation is an entity, and by its very nature could not be guilty of a
crime.8 5 Since the partners as individuals would be arrested and
32. The major areas covered in the articles are sales, commercial paper, bank deposits and collections, bulk transfers, warehouse receipts and bills of lading, investment
securities and secured transactions.
33. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 50A-4-402 (Repl. 1962).
34. State v. Spears, 57 N.M. 400, 259 P.2d 356 (1953).
35. Id. The opinion adopted the position of the California courts as stated in People
v. Schomig, 74 Cal. App. 109, 239 P. 413, 414 (1925):
"In most respects a partnership is but a relation with no legal being as
distinct from the members who comprise it. It is not a person, either natural
or artificial."
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prosecuted rather than the partnership,3 6 who could recover damages if the proximate cause for the criminal proceeding had been
the wrongful dishonor of partnership checks? The partnership could
not recover because it was not, and could not have been arrested or
prosecuted. The individual partners would be denied recovery on
the authority of Loucks since they were not the "customers," as the
court interprets that term, of the bank.
One might think that individual recovery would be possible on a
tort theory, regardless of the conceptual treatment of the partnership. Comment 2 to § 4-402 of the Uniform Commercial Code
states:
The liability of the drawee for dishonor has sometimes been stated as
one for breach of contract, sometimes as for negligence or other
breach of a tort duty, and sometimes as for defamation. This section
does not attempt to specify a theory. 7
The Loucks opinion disposes of the tort theory, however, by apparently slipping into a contractualconcept of duty: "No duty was
owed to [the partner] personally by reason of the debtor-creditor
relationship between the bank and the partnership. ' 3' Duty in tort
law does not depend on contractual relationships.
The New Mexico court has held in a pre-Code case, Young v. New
Mexico BroadcastingCo.,8 9 that defamation of a partnership name
is defamation of the individual partners and gives a right of recovery to the partners for their individual damages. Since Loucks
denied the partners any personal recovery, the court must interpret
§ 4-402 as either excluding a defamation theory entirely or, at the
least, excluding a defamation theory when no contractual relationship exists between the bank and the injured party. Their holding
that the bank was under no contractual relationship with the individual partners denies the partners any personal recovery based on
defamation.
Any theory of recovery except contract was effectually excluded
by the decision. The result is to give banks an immunity from tort
actions in specific situations involving partnerships, no matter how
36. Unless, of course, the court should decide to extend the entity concept to the
area of the partnership's criminal liability.
37. U.C.C. §4-402, Comment 2.
38. 76 N.M. at 744, 418 P.2d at 197.
39. 60 N.M. 475, 292 P.2d 776 (1956).
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negligent or willful their conduct may be. As was pointed out in a
recent decision of the California Supreme Court, there is "no reason
for according to an institution so basic to the contemporary society
as a bank a special non-statutory exemption from general tort liability."4 ° Loucks does just that.
CHARLES WESLEY DANIELS

40. Weaver v. Bank of America Nat. Trust and Say. Ass'n, 30 Cal. Rptr. 4, 11, 380
P.2d 644, 651 (1963).

